Abstract: This study examines the relationship between Executive Stock Option (ESO) exercise and firm performance in Malaysia for the period 2002-2008. We found a significant positive relationship between ESO exercise and firm performance for both market and accounting-based performance measures using data on ESO exercising from 201 non-financial companies. Our panel data analysis of fixed effect estimation indicated that Malaysian executives are most likely to exercise their options immediately after they are granted; suggesting intended behaviour of adopting ESOs rather than maximising the shareholders' wealth as governance mechanism. This early exercise pattern of Malaysian executives also indicates that executives are averse to the risk.
Introduction
The agency problem is a necessary consequence that arises from the contractual view of the firm (Coase, 1937; Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
To shape the top executives, compensation policy is one of the most important factors in mitigating the agency problem. It helps in determining the kind of executives needed for an organisation's success. Whereas public pressures discourage directors from paying very high salaries and bonuses to his or her managers for good performance, the directors of companies are also reluctant to penalise them for poor performance. In the long run, this reluctance grinds down the relationship between pay and performance, making the compensation system isolated (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . Again, an aggressive compensation system may result in lower compensation for less skilled executives. It would provide better chances of firing for poor performance, and those executives may be substituted with higher skilled ones. Moreover, Haugen and Senbet (1981) demonstrated that the stock options strategy, which is based on perk consumption and the risk incentive problem of executives, was the tool that could align the interests between owner managers and outside shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) , who originally proposed the stock option solution, concluded that by combining the call and put option strategy, the agency problem may be mitigated. This is because the option prompt compensating agency problem is associated with perk consumption and risk incentives. In this study, we first focus on the ESO exercise issue using data on observed Malaysian executives based on ESO granting of sample companies. It basically examines the pattern of exercise behaviour of executives who receive inalienable ESO from his or her employers while considering the industry effects of companies. This study substantially fills up the literature gap of ESO exercising pattern of Malaysian economy.
The spirit of agency problem is the separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) in modern corporations. Separation of ownership and control refers to the separation of decision-making and the residual risk bearing that leads to the agency problem. The free alienability feature of residual claims works as an external governance mechanism. This mechanism is related to the stock markets in valuing shares and transferring them with little expenses. Share prices are signals that reflect management decisions over a period of time. Therefore, utilising the stock market as an external governance mechanism adjusts the internal decision process taken by the management towards the maximisation of stockholders' wealth. Equally, the exploitation of residual risk bearers (by taking the favourable decisions) is more pronounced in the era of Security and Exchange Commission and in Corporate Governance faction. Investors are willing to invest in firms that can maximise his or her wealth. A manager, or owner-manager, therefore, would raise the capital from investors and use it in either productive or self-interested activities. The question to ask is: How do we assure the investors that the managers would generate returns on his or her fund? ESO is the right given to the company's employees to purchase its shares at a predetermined price over a specific period. One of the reasons for adopting ESO scheme is to allow the firms to acquire employer stock from existing shareholders. This would reduce the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Eligible employees would be entitled to exercise these options granted. The practice of using stock ownership by executives has been around since 1920s. Louis O. Kelso, a San Francisco Attorney, made it official by designing the employee stock trust the first time in 1956 (Stern and Comstock, 1978) . During 1960s and early 1970s, the literature presented the risk-sharing problem where cooperating parties have different perceptions of risks. In other words, problems arise when one party (principal) delegates the work to another party (agent) and each have different goals and division of labour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Agency theory extends this risk awareness as an agency problem, especially at the ubiquitous agency relationship.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background of ESO granting and the exercising issues that affect firm performance; and summarises the existing literature concerning ESO exercising behaviour and its impact on firm performance. Section 3 describes the methodologies adopted, and data and sampling procedures. Section 4 explains and analyses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study with significant findings.
Theory and applications
Generally, an option holder who wishes to lessen the option position will sell all or part of his option holdings (Kulatilaka and Murcus, 1994) . As ESO is not tradable; the only way to hedge the risk for executives is to exercise them. Therefore, ESOs would be exercised earlier when it is in the money, though it may not reflect the actual market value of the options (Bettis et al., 2005) . A basic reason for granting an option is to increase the stock price and inspire the executives. Shareholders are prone to justifying the trade-off between the cost of retaining and inspiring the executives relative to its benefits (Huddart, 1994) . The problem arises if the creative actions taken by executives have an effect on stock price. These actions, again, vary with respect to the executive's stake in the company. Accordingly, the incentive effects of stock options differ based on the proportion of stakes held by the executives. By developing utility maximising models, Grasselli and Henderson (2009) rationalise the early exercise behaviour of ESO subject to constraints on selling the option and underlying stock. If the proportion is large compared with outstanding shares of the company, then stock option exercising by executives dilutes more ownership of existing shareholders.
Considering incentive effects and the cost of granting stock option to executives, one may find it complicated since the ESO is not transferable compared with tradable stock option (Bettis et al., 2005) . This non-transferability signifies that the value of the options may differ to executives than his or her cost to shareholders. This feature makes it more complex in valuing executive stock than ordinary stock options (Carpenter, 1998) . Furthermore, the executives are not able to fully diversify his or her stock holdings due to their human capital attachment to the company (Carpenter et al., 2010) . They may also require early exercise of the options upon departure from the company or may exercise late due to taxes or inside information issues. The nature of ownership and control that lead to the agency problem is different around the world. Studies by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Zhuang (2001) show that Asian executives seem to design and control their companies' management compensation plans for his or her own benefits.
Unlike direct cash compensation, the adoption of executive share option is at the firm's discretion. Adoption of ESOs is an internal decision. Large firms have a greater incentive to adopt ESOs to mitigate the potential agency problems (Ding and Sun, 2001 ). After obtaining the approval for ESOs adoption of ESO scheme, the board determines the structure of the option plan. Among the parameters usually considered are exercise price, the minimum retention period and the expiry date. However, the exercise price and expiry date of the option are governed by ESOs by-law and therefore, are usually rubber-stamping procedures. The required holding period, which is a contractual term that asserts required waiting time before the employees can exercise his or her options, is at the discretion of the board. Owing to the complexity of obtaining ESO granting and exercising data, there are limited studies on executives' stock option exercising pattern. Hemmer et al. (1996) studied the exercising of ESO by top executive officers, considering ESO risk as a variable in returns and the market to strike ratio to examine managerial exercise of option response in terms of hedging. They found a positive relationship between the variability of stock option returns and the remaining life of stock option at exercise. This finding explains the executives' early exercise behaviour, which is done to diversify the risk. The study also found that association between option variability and early exercise is diminished if the option risk is hedged by the firm. Lambert et al. (1991) analysed the behaviour of exercising stock option using US data from an executive's perspective. Their finding indicates that if an executive's other wealth is attached to the stock returns, the valuation of the stock option by an executive would differ from the cost of the plans. Substantial differences of executives wealth attached to the company lead the risk averse executives to exercise his or her options earlier. Similarly, Heath et al. (1999) investigated employee stock option exercise behaviour by controlling the psychological factors that influence its exercise behaviour in NYSE and NASDAQ companies, and found a positive relation of stock return during the preceding months. Klein and Maug (2011) also offer such empirical metaphors of option exercise examples. The exercise behaviour roughly doubled when the stock price beat the maximum price during the previous year. Huddart (1994) found the same justification of employees' optimal exercise policy that led the exercising of stock option before maturity based on risk aversion, investment opportunities and wealth.
These studies basically focused on the valuation of the stock option. Forgoing the remaining life span, stock options are exercised earlier in firms when it is deep in money or with high stock price volatility (Bettis et al., 2005) . In other words, options will be exercised early when the expected benefit is greater than holding it. Since managers are risk averse and the option is non-transferable, they exercise the option before its maturity (Huddart, 1994) . When the option is exercised, executives bring in cash into the firm. This exercise pattern would differ if the holding period led to utility maximisation. Thus, option values change with different incentives based on individual or firm-specific characteristics. To capture these characteristics, panel data models are developed to verify the relationship between ESO exercising and firm performance of Malaysian non-financial companies after controlling firm-specific variables.
Methodology and data
In light of the seasonality in the Malaysian stock market (Pandey, 2002) ; it gives a sound financial background to analyse ESOs exercising issues. Executives may time their options granted to improve his or her returns. Our objective is to examine the relationship between the ESO exercising and firm performance to explore the exercise pattern of Malaysian executives. Firms listed under Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) main market are entitled to 10% of shares as ESOs offering of any issue. On the contrary, Executive Stock Option Plan (ESOP) in the USA is not subjected to exchange imposed authoritarian limitations where the firm's shareholders decide the adoption or characteristics of ESOP. ESOs in Malaysia are similar to US ESOP practice of 10 years lifetime that is equivalent to its grant period but not linked with its exercise. There is a window limit of exercising period that could reduce the incentive for executives to hold on to their options (Yeo et al., 1999) . Moreover, a number of firms impose a limit on the amount that can be exercised during the period.
In terms of the pricing of options, it is determined by a five trading-day average in Malaysia, prior to the grant of options. Taxing amount is calculated as ordinary personal income, based on the difference between market value and the strike price of the option. This is similar to that of the Executives' other income but there is no capital gain tax in Malaysia. In contrast, executives in USA are obliged to pay tax when the option is sold, based on either capital gain or ordinary income tax, depending on his or her holding period. Though each firm has its own distinctive ESOs proposal, the similarities are all surrounded by a regulated by-law. In the presence of diverse ownership structure and poor governance system, concentrated shareholdings lead to distinctive agency problem (Lins and Servaes, 1999) in Malaysia. Therefore, this study attempts to recognise the pattern of ESO exercising behaviour by Malaysian executives, which may be granted for reasons other than creating value.
To align the shareholders' interests with those of the executives, it is necessary that incentives are sensitive to the returns. Hence, it is informative to study whether the performances of executives result in increasing the wealth of the shareholders. In this study, Tobin's q is the primary measure of firm performance that is useful for the valuation of a company. Firm performance is also measured through the profitability measurement: Return on Assets (ROA). It indicates the usefulness of each dollar of assets that management control. The higher the level of ROA, in the greater would the level of utility for the shareholder be. This refers to maximisation of the shareholders' wealth. Tobin's q represents a market-based performance (ex-ante) measurement while ROA represents accounting-based performance (ex-post) measurement. Previous research found that ROA will result in greater levels of utility for the shareholders compared with Tobin's q as it concerns the managerial actions of short and long run overall performance. Conversely, accounting measures are not able to reflect the future price consequences of current managerial actions. For these reasons, accounting numbers are more appropriate to the firms in their early periods. The study also inquires about firm-specific characteristic effects that may lead to better firm performance.
The study looks into exercising behaviour of Malaysian executives in gauging the pattern of exercise timing that may reflect the motives of those who use private information. It basically attempts to cover the pattern in exercising behaviour from option granting evidences of 201 public listed non-financial companies under Bursa Malaysia. Samples are selected purposively based on ESO granting, which was used in consecutive years through the entire period of the study. A test, developed by Hausman (1978) , chooses the model to be applied between the fixed effects and the random effects models. Therefore, panel data fixed effect analysis is adopted, which takes into account the heterogeneity effects of the companies selected (Lam and Chng, 2006; Zhou, 2001) . The study employed the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalised Least Square (GLS) models to ensure the robustness and validity of the findings that satisfies the assumptions of Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM). Since there a considerable variability in the earnings between corporate entities, GLS method is used to capture the information contained in this unequal variability (Gujarati, 2003) , though OLS estimator is unbiased. ESO exercising is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when managers exercise their non-transferable options for particular year. If otherwise, it is 0. The empirical relationships of regression equations for yearly ESO exercising (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Hillegeist and Penalva, 2003) 
In the above equations, where TQ is the Tobin's q; it is a ratio of the market value of a company to the replacement costs of the company's assets (Gugler et al., 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) . ROA is the return on Assets; it is the ratio of a company's annual income divided by its total assets (Duffhues et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . ESO is the ESO exercising; a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if company exercises ESO for a particular year, otherwise 0 (Bettis et al., 2005; Huddart and Lang, 1996) . RV is the return volatility; it is the standard deviation of yearly stock return, 1-year lag (Ittner et al., 2003; Mehran and Tracy, 2001) . DR is the debt ratio; it is measured as the book value of interest bearing long-term and short-term debt divided by the book value of companies total assets multiply 100 (Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo, 2007; Wei and Zhang, 2008) . G is the growth of the company; it is measured as the average of five years sales growth (Jensen et al., 1992; Porta et al., 2002) . S is the size of the company; it is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Berger et al., 1997; Gugler et al., 2008) . IND is the industry dummies; industries are indicator variables that equal to 1 if the firm reports it belongs to a particular industry, and 0 otherwise (Anderson et al., 2000; Ittner et al., 2003) . The study covers 1407 observations of Malaysian non-financial companies, which were used to examine the relationship between firm performance and ESO exercising, after controlling for firm-specific characteristics. They are: firm-specific risk, financial leverage, growth and firm size under varying corporate sectors. The historical or secondary data used and calculated in this paper comprises of Tobin's q, ROA, ESO exercising, return volatility, debt ratio, growth and size. A longitudinal study has been employed to correlate the relationships for a 7-year period, from 2002 to 2008. These seven years were chosen to capture the true picture concerning the movement of the company's performance, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. Since financial data have been obtained from audited financial statements (i.e., Annual Reports) and databases (Bloomberg, Data Stream) from reliable sources, in which the consistency, reliability and accuracy of the information were controlled. Data for ESO exercising were obtained through the Bursa Malaysia website, from the Annual Reports' of the respective companies. Number of ESO per year is shown in Table 1 as the study uses a methodology where each year is represented by a dummy variable. Table 1 Number of ESO through the years for all firms 
Results and analyses
There are a total of 201 companies in the sample that adopted ESOs. These 201 firms or 25% of ESOs are non-financial firms (830) trade in Bursa Malaysia. Among these 830 firms, 33.4% of ESOs companies are from Industrial Products, 21% are from Consumer Services, 20.1% are from Consumer Goods and 15% are from Technology of respective sectors of listed companies under Bursa Malaysia. Furthermore, it is found that the majority of ESOs adopted firms are from Industrial Products (61.2%) and Consumer Goods (20.4%) of sample companies. Other firms are from Technology (7%), Consumer Services (6.5%), Utilities (2.5%), Oil and Gas (1%), Telecommunication (1%) and Healthcare (0.5%). These figures are projected as number of firms traded in Table 2 . Next we consider the multicollinearity problem to ensure that all explanatory variables are independent to each other regardless of their relation. If the explanatory variables are correlated, it violates one of the CLRM assumptions that are very serious for regression estimation (Stevens, 2002) . The problem arises from the high correlation between independent variables, which is known as the multicollinearity problem. A simple Pearson correlation test (Table 3) is performed to check this relation between independent variables. By combining cross-sectional and time-series data, the extra variations set up by panel data also help to alleviate the multicollinearity problem (Brooks, 2008) . It is found that firm size is positively related with debt ratio and growth; and negatively related with return volatility at 1% significant level. These variables are correlated by 23%, 16% and 22%, respectively, which is much lower than the benchmark of allowing the relation of 80% (Gujarati, 2003) . Other significant correlations among variables are even smaller, which does not cause the multicollinearity problem. Hemmer et al. (1996) , Huddart (1994) and Lambert et al. (1991) . Hence, one can conclude that risk averse Malaysian employees exercise his or her options immediately once clear monetary gains are present. The risk level is measured by return volatility. This shows an inverse relationship with firm performance by both estimators, though they are not significant. Among other control variables, growth is positively significant by both pooled and fixed effects estimators which exhibit very low regression coefficients. Similarly, leverage (debt ratio) is negatively significant at 1% level for both estimators. Firm size is not significant and is positively related with firm performance. Table 5 is the result of both pooled and fixed effects regression estimations for a dummy of ESO exercised throughout the years to validate the pattern of ESO exercising on firm performance (TQ) obtained through GLS estimation. It shows a similar positive significant relationship of ESO exercising for year 2002, year 2006 and year 2007 by fixed effect estimator with increased magnitude of beta coefficients over time. Therefore, it can be concluded that the effect of ESO valuation is the function of executives' exercising strategy ex ante basis. There is, again, an economic contraction in Malaysia which began in the third quarter of year 2007. Overall, it is observed that option exercising by Malaysian executives follows similar trends with GLS estimator of market-based performance measures. Table 4 OLS estimations of market-based performance (TQ) Among the control variables, all relationships are consistent with previous results. In terms of goodness of fit of the models, both estimators exhibit similar coefficients of determination. Return volatility exhibits a significant inverse relationship with firm performance by both pooled and fixed effects estimators at 1% level when accounting-based measures are considered. This indicates a high standard deviation of returns, which eventually affects firm performance negatively. This indication may propose that higher volatility leads the early exercise of options by the Malaysian executives. Among other control variables, debt ratio is negatively related with firm performance at 1% significant level by both estimators that are consistent with previous section's results, and with a higher magnitude of beta coefficients. Firm growth also exhibits a steady positive significant relationship with performance by both estimators. On the other hand, firm size is positively significant with accounting-based performance measurement. Table 7 is the result of both pooled and fixed effects regression estimations for a dummy variable of ESO exercised throughout the years to validate the pattern of ESO exercising on firm performance (ROA) obtained through GLS estimation. The results show the consistent positive significant relationship of ESO exercising by both pooled and fixed effects estimators. Among the control variables, all relationships are consistent with previous results. In terms of goodness of fit of the models, both pooled and fixed effect models explain similar variation to predict dependent variable. 
ESO exercising effects on firm performance (TQ)

Variables
ESO exercising effects on firm performance (ROA)
Industry effects of the companies
To verify the industry effects of sample companies, panel data pooled and fixed effects models are run for both accounting and market-based performance of ESO exercising. Oil and Gas industry is found to be positively significant at 1% level by both performance measurements. In addition, Oil and Gas has the higher contribution to the Malaysian Economy than other industries, which is consistent with all findings. On the other hand, Industrial Products, Consumer Goods, Technology and Utility industries exhibit significant negative relationships against firm performance (ROA), suggesting poor market competitions in these industries. In terms of goodness of fit of the models, both estimators exhibit similar variation of explaining the dependent variables.
Discussions and conclusion
In the presence of the scarcity of Malaysian literatures, hypotheses are developed based on the reputed literatures worldwide. This paper is the first to analyse the pattern of ESO exercising behaviour of Malaysian executives using panel data specifications. The study verified the relationship between ESO exercising and firm performance to explore the exercise pattern of Malaysian executives against market and accounting-based performance measures. In general, it is found that this relationship is significant, confirming the fact that Malaysian executives exercise their option immediately after granted when it is in the money. This early exercise pattern ignores the time value of options when a greater proportion of executives' wealth is attached to firm performance. The early exercise pattern of stock options is consistent with the notion that executives are usually risk averse investors. Therefore, we may conclude that Malaysian executives are risk averse as they are prone to rebalancing his or her portfolios. Moreover, the adoption of ESOs identifies the time preferences of ESO granting in Malaysia. In other words, executives may expropriate the minority shareholders' wealth due to poor corporate governance structure in Asia. These findings would be of interest to corporate regulators and the government to identify the direction for regulating the use of ESOs. Among control variables, the significant inverse relationship of return volatility indicates the lower value of a firm with higher stock return variability. Option plans are implemented more with high leveraged and growth opportunistic (Kato et al., 2005) firms. Thus, highly leveraged firms may have an inverse relationship with the stock options of executives. It is found that a firm's growth is positively related with firm performance, and leverage is negatively correlated at 1% significant level. The inverse relationship of debt ratio refers to pecking order theory, since high-growth firms finance their projects from internally generated funds, rather than outside (debt) financing. The magnitude of the coefficients indicates the ESOs adopted firms have relatively low growth and leverage. On the other hand, the free rider problem is severe in large firms as a huge number of employees are entitled to ESO but individuals are having a very small amount of shares each. As large firms are difficult to monitor compared with small firms, it is found that large firms use ESOs more frequently than small ones (Ding and Sun, 2001) . Leverage also plays an important role in executive compensation by increasing the executives' incentives in paying for performance. It may encourage executives to pursue riskier projects at the expense of debtholders but in favour of shareholders (John and John, 1993) . This shift may be anticipated by the debtholders who will cause the stock option to rise to debtholders' premium. The size of the firm is positively significant with accounting-based performance measure (ROA) at 1% level, which indicates that the bigger the size, the better the performance. Finally, the positive significant relationship of Oil and Gas industry with firm performance by both market and accounting-based measures are indicating the better product market competition in this industry.
